LOUISIANA PUBLIC DEFENDER BOARD

 

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IN THE FIFTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PARISH OF PEINE DE MORT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
No. _____

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STATE OF LOUISIANA, Plaintiff
v.
JOHN CLIENT, Defendant

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MOTION TO PRECLUDE THE STATE FROM RELYING
ON ANY NON-STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

COMES NOW, JOHN CLIENT, by counsel, and moves this Court pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 2, 3, 5, 13, 14, 16 & 17 of the Louisiana Constitution to bar introduction of any non-statutory aggravating circumstances. In support of his motion, Mr. CLIENT states as follows:

1. Since this is to be a capital prosecution, exacting standards must be met to assure that it is fair. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has held, "[d]eath, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the jury's determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." State v. Myles, 389 So. 2d 12, 30 (La. 1979) (citing cases).
2. The Louisiana death penalty statute provides explicitly that the list of statutory aggravating circumstances "shall be considered aggravating circumstances. . . ." La. Code Crim. Pro. art. 905.4. The Legislature has expressly demonstrated its intent to narrow the scope of aggravating circumstances and to preclude the presentation by the State of evidence which does not directly relate to a specified statutory aggravating circumstance. Absent the defense opening some door to allow rebuttal evidence to a mitigating circumstance, then, the introduction of evidence relating to any non-statutory aggravating circumstances violates the statute.
3. Introduction of evidence concerning non-statutory aggravating circumstances exposes the jury to irrelevant and prejudicial matters, injecting arbitrary considerations into the jury's weighing process and thus failing to adequately channel and proscribe the jury's discretion. The goal is to avoid creating the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in an arbitrary manner in violation of both the United States and the Louisiana Constitution. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983) (constitution mandates that "an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder").
4. The Constitution requires that an "aggravating circumstance must be construed to permit the sentencer to make a principled distinction between those who deserve the death penalty and those who do not." Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 3099, 111 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1990). Non-statutory aggravating evidence jeopardizes the constitutionally mandated functions of "genuinely narrow[ing] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and . . . reasonably justify[ing] the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 877. Non-statutory aggravating evidence inflames the jury and diverts it from its required task of balancing aggravating evidence and mitigating evidence in the manner prescribed by the Legislature. Indeed, non-statutory evidence may "so infect[] the balancing process . . . that it is constitutionally impermissible to let the sentence stand." Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 86, 104 S. Ct. 378, 78 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1983) (quoting Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 956, 103 S. Ct. 3418, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1134 (1983)).
5. "In order to pass federal constitutional muster capital sentencing procedures must be designed to prevent a substantial risk that the death penalty will be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner by directing and limiting the jury's discretion so that the death penalty will be imposed in a consistent and rational manner and so that there will be a meaningful basis for distinguishing the cases in which it is imposed from the many in which it is not." State v. Brogdon, 457 So. 2d 616, 625 (La. 1984) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976)).

6. In light of these principles, it is important to resolve the issue of what aggravating evidence the prosecution seeks to use. First, the defense has a due process and Eighth Amendment right to notice of what the prosecution seeks to use against him. As the Court held in State v. Taylor, 514 So. 2d 755 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987), when evidence is to be introduced against the accused, "[m]inimal due process requires the defendant be afforded the opportunity to explain the incident and counter [its] prejudicial impact. . . ." Id. at 757.
7. Second, there is an immense danger that a First Amendment violation may occur in this case. In 1991, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether an individual's membership in an Aryan Rights group should be admissible in a capital trial. The Court ruled that it should not be. See Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 117 L. Ed. 2d 309 (1992). The Court, through Chief Justice Rehnquist, noted that "the First Amendment protects an individual's right to join groups and associate with others holding similar beliefs. Because his right to associate with the Aryan Brotherhood is constitutionally protected . . . admission of evidence related to that association . . . violated his constitutional rights." Id., 112 S. Ct. at 1097; see also Flanagan v. State, 846 P.2d 1053 (Nev. 1993) (applying Dawson to condemn use of evidence that the accused had been a member of an occult "coven"). Obviously, this rationale applies to Mr. CLIENT's membership in a motorcycle club, and the prosecution should not seek to make reference to it.
8. There are all sorts of other limitations on the evidence that the prosecution may introduce at the penalty phase, even with respect to statutory aggravating circumstances. See, e.g., State v. English, 367 So. 2d 815, 817-818 (La. 1979) (death sentence reversed because trial court allowed hearsay testimony by state to show prior conviction aggravating circumstance); State v. Comeaux, 514 So. 2d 84, 97-99 (La. 1987) (state barred from calling psychiatrist that interviewed defendant in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel to rebut mental state testimony by defense at sentencing phase).
WHEREFORE, Mr. CLIENT prays for an order barring the State from introducing any evidence at the sentencing trial which is not relevant to the existence of the statutory aggravating circumstances that may lawfully be submitted at the sentencing trial, and providing that any attempt to introduce such evidence will result in a mistrial.
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