IN THE FIFTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PARISH OF PEINE DE MORT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
No. _____

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STATE OF LOUISIANA, Plaintiff
v.
JOHN CLIENT, Defendant

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MOTION TO PRECLUDE THE STATE FROM INTRODUCING
VICTIM-IMPACT EVIDENCE

COMES NOW, JOHN CLIENT, by counsel, and moves this Court pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 2, 3, 5, 13, 14, 16 & 17 of the Louisiana Constitution to bar introduction of victim-impact evidence. In support of his motion, Mr. CLIENT states as follows:

1. Since this is to be a capital prosecution, exacting standards must be met to assure that it is fair. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has held, "[d]eath, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the jury's determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." State v. Myles, 389 So. 2d 12, 30 (La. 1979) (citing cases).
2. Until recently, the rule had previously been that victim impact evidence was not admissible. See, e.g., State v. Prejean, 379 So. 2d 240, 244 (La. 1979) ("the number of the [widow's] children was irrelevant"). A recent decision has expanded on this, albeit without a great deal of clarity. See State v. Bernard, 608 So. 2d 966 (La. 1992).
3. The Bernard court still lays down the rule of relevance: "The Louisiana capital sentencing statute enacted in 1976 limit the evidence presented by the prosecutor in the sentencing hearing to that which is relevant to the circumstances of the murder or to the character and propensities of the murderer." State v. Bernard, 608 So. 2d at 970. Within this rule, there are some matters which are clearly still irrelevant. "Evidence of the victim's survivors' opinions about the crime and the murderer is clearly irrelevant to any issue in a capital sentencing hearing." State v. Bernard, 608 So. 2d at 970.
4. With other issues, it is not clear what is relevant. On the issue of relevance, in Wiley v. State, 484 So. 2d 339 (Miss. 1986), the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that victim-impact evidence rarely actually is relevant to the issues at hand:
"Ordinarily the character or reputation of the deceased person is not involved as part of the issue in a murder case and proof relative thereto is generally inadmissible." Shinall v. State, 199 So. 2d 251, 257 (Miss. 1967); see also, Hubbard v. State, 288 So. 2d 716 (Miss. 1974). It is generally agreed that the prosecution cannot enter proof of the good character of the decedent as part of its main case. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence, Section 193 (2nd Ed. 1972); see also, 40 Am.Jur.2d Homicide Section 308 (1968) (before the character of the deceased has been attacked by the defendant, the prosecutor may not introduce evidence of the reputation of the deceased for peacefulness).

Id. at 349; see also McGahee v. State, 554 So. 2d 454, 469-70 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); People v. Simms, 121 Ill. 2d. 259, 117 Ill. Dec. 147, 520 N.E.2d 308, 313-15 (1988); People v. Washington, 54 Ill. App. 2d 467, 204 N.E. 2d 25 (Ill. App. 1964).
WHEREFORE, Mr. CLIENT prays that this Court order an evidentiary hearing, and then enters an order barring the State from introducing any victim-impact evidence.
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