IN THE FIFTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PARISH OF PEINE DE MORT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
No. _____

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STATE OF LOUISIANA, Plaintiff
v.
JOHN CLIENT, Defendant

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MOTION TO PRECLUDE MR. CLIENT FROM BEING SHACKLED IN PUBLIC

COMES NOW, JOHN CLIENT, by counsel, and moves this Court pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article 1, Sections 2, 3, 5, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, and 24 of the Louisiana Constitution, and other law set out below, to order that Mr. CLIENT not be shackled in public. In support of his motion, Mr. CLIENT states as follows:
1. This is a capital case. Mr. CLIENT, an indigent, faces the death penalty.
2. A trial court commits reversible error if it allows a jury to be exposed to any vestige of the accused's incarceration-shackles, handcuffs or other manacles. The right of a person being tried "to be free of all manner of shackles or bonds" is a "common law right." Rush v. State, 301 So. 2d 297, 300 (Miss. 1974). The right was explained by the Eleventh Circuit in Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, rehearing denied with opinion, 833 F.2d 250 (11th Cir. 1987):
Initially, the prejudice perceived when a defendant is seen in shackles by the jury involves the presumption of innocence. The issue has generally arisen in the context of a determination of guilt or innocence. Courts focus on the prejudicial impact restraints have on the defendant's presumption of innocence.

Id., 823 F.2d at 1450 (citing Allen v. Montgomery, 728 F.2d 1409, 1413 (11th Cir. 1984)); Collins v. State, 164 Ga.App. 482, 297 S.E.2d 503, 505 (1982); State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 226 S.E.2d 353, 367 (1976). Obviously the same prejudicial effect results whether this shackling occurs before the prospective jury in the courtroom, or before the prospective jurors in the media prior to trial. Steps should be taken, then, to close that particular stable door before the horse escapes.
3. Even after the defendant stands as a convicted felon--and the presumption of innocence deserts him--"a jury might view the shackles as first-hand evidence of future dangerousness and uncontrollable behavior which if unmanageable in the courtroom may also be unmanageable in prison, leaving death as a proper decision." Elledge, 823 F.2d at 1450. The accused has the right to be tried without the obvious trappings of dangerous criminality.
4. The perception that the defendant is a dangerous "animal" may not be given by the extensive and obvious security measures of the sheriff's department:
The Supreme Court has characterized shackling as an "inherently prejudicial practice." Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S. Ct. 1340, 1345, 89 L. Ed. 2d 525, 534 (1986). "Not only is it possible that the sight of shackles and gags might have a significant effect on the jury's feelings about the defendant, but the use of the technique is itself something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1970). When shackling occurs, it must be subjected to "close judicial scrutiny. . . ." Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1692-93, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1976).

Elledge, 823 F.2d at 1451 (footnote omitted) (citing Woodard v. Perrin, 692 F.2d 220, 221 (1st Cir. 1982); Hardin v. Estelle, 365 F.Supp. 39, 47 (1973), aff'd on other grounds, 484 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1973)).
WHEREFORE, Mr. CLIENT respectfully moves that he not be shackled in public.
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