IN THE FIFTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PARISH OF PEINE DE MORT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
No. _____

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STATE OF LOUISIANA, Plaintiff
v.
JOHN CLIENT, Defendant

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MOTION TO ENJOIN THE VICTIM'S FAMILY AND
FRIENDS FROM SITTING DIRECTLY BEFORE THE JURY
AND SHOWING EMOTION IN THE COURTROOM DURING THE TRIAL

COMES NOW, JOHN CLIENT, by counsel, and moves this Court pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 2, 3, 5, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, and 24 of the Louisiana Constitution to enjoin the victim's family and friends, or members of any victims' rights groups, from sitting directly before the jury and showing emotion in the courtroom during the trial. In support of his motion, Mr. CLIENT states as follows:
1. This is a capital murder case. Mr. CLIENT, an indigent, faces the death penalty.
2. Even in the non-capital case, appeals to passion and prejudice and other inflammatory appeals to the jury are totally impermissible. See Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 247-48, 63 S. Ct. 561, 87 L. Ed. 734 (1943); United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Gasparo, 744 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1984); Parks v. State, 254 Ga. 403, 330 S.E.2d 686 (1985); Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113, 303 S.E.2d 266 (1983); American Bar Association, Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function, Section 3-5.8 (c) (1982).
3. The proscription against injecting irrelevant emotionalism applies with even more force in a capital trial, since in any appeal the Supreme Court "must look to whether the argument introduced passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor into the proceeding which contributed to the jury's recommendation of the death penalty." State v. Byrne, 483 So. 2d 564, 574 (La. 1986); see also, e.g., Brooks v. Francis, 716 F.2d 780, 788 (11th Cir. 1983), reh'g granted and vacated, 728 F.2d 1358 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[a] prosecutor may not incite the passions of a jury when a person's life hangs in the balance"); Tucker v. Zant, 724 F.2d 882, 888 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[t]he Constitution will not permit arguments on issues extrinsic to the crime or the criminal aimed at inflaming the jury's passions, playing on its fears, or otherwise goading it into an emotional state more receptive to the call for imposition of death").
4. One source of great emotion arises when the victim's family vents its obvious grief in the courtroom. See, e.g., Fuselier v. State, 468 So. 2d 45 (Miss. 1985) (reversing where trial court allowed the victim's daughter to sit within the rail).
5. For example, while it is very clear that the family, or the victims' rights people, come to court to support the prosecution's cause, it is equally clear that "the victim's survivors' opinions about the crime and the murderer is clearly irrelevant to any issue in a capital sentencing hearing." State v. Bernard, 608 So. 2d 699 (La. 1992). If--as is legally evident--such opinions cannot be expressed on the witness stand, they cannot be made clear by extraneous actions in the courtroom.
WHEREFORE, Mr. CLIENT respectfully moves that this Court take action to ensure that such shows of emotionalism do not occur at his trial.
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