IN THE FIFTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PARISH OF PEINE DE MORT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
No. _____

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STATE OF LOUISIANA, Plaintiff
v.
JOHN CLIENT, Defendant

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MOTION TO PRECLUDE UNIFORMED POLICE OFFICERS
FROM ATTENDING THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MR. CLIENT AND
LIMIT THE SHOW OF FORCE IN THE COURTROOM

COMES NOW, JOHN CLIENT, by counsel, and moves this Court pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 2, 3, 5, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, and 24 of the Louisiana Constitution to prohibit uniformed police officers from attending his trial, and limit the police show of force in the courtroom. In support of his motion, Mr. CLIENT states as follows:
1. This is a capital murder case. Mr. CLIENT, an indigent, faces the death penalty.
2. Mr. CLIENT anticipates that there will be uniformed law enforcement officers present in the courtroom during his trial. There may even be some officers who come in to watch the trial. At any given time they are either being paid by the state or, while in their uniforms, acting under apparent state authority.
3. It is clear that the presence of uniformed police officers will violate Mr. CLIENT's right to a fair trial. In Dennis v. Dees, 278 F.Supp. 354 (E.D. La. 1968), a federal habeas corpus action brought after the defendant had been convicted in state court of murdering a fellow inmate at the Louisiana State Penitentiary, there were armed guards stationed throughout the courtroom. The trial judge sought to excuse the use of obviously excessive force by stating that it merely reflected the policy of the local Sheriff's office. The reviewing court rejected that excuse as insufficient to justify the show of force in the courtroom, because the trial judge had effectively abdicated his role as the guardian of the defendant's rights. Id. at 358.
4. As the Supreme Court of West Virginia has stated: "Mere reliance on `policy' or judgement of local law enforcement officials is not sufficient justification. The discretion is in the court's name and must be exercised, not delegated." State v. Peacher, 167 W. Va. 540, 280 S.E.2d 559, 573 (W.Va. 1981); see also State v. Peacher, 167 W. Va. 540, 280 S.E.2d 559, 572, 574 (W. Va. 1981) (citing cases) (holding that the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of extra security precautions before allowing a plainclothes deputy sheriff who was alleged to have had contact with the jury sit within the bar of the court fifteen feet behind the defendant).
5. Even where there is a bona fide need for additional security the courts have held that the trial courts should explore the least restrictive alternative:
[O]nce it has been determined that special security precautions are called for, `the least drastic and conspicuous measures reasonably available that will meet the particular need' should be employed. It is well settled that unusual physical restraints should be employed only as a last resort.

Commonwealth v. DeVasto, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 363, 387 N.E.2d 1169, 1172 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 364 Mass. 471, 476, 305 N.E.2d 830 (1973)); accord Commonwealth v. Agiasottelis, 336 Mass. 12, 16, 142 N.E.2d 386 (1957); Hall v. State, 199 Ind. 592, 159 N.E. 420 (1928) ("In the modern court-room, as little show of arms must be made as possible and ordinarily the necessary restraint can be accomplished by placing nonuniformed guards near the prisoner") (emphasis supplied); Eaddy v. People, 115 Colo. 488, 492, 174 P.2d 717, 718-719 (1946); Anthony v. State, 521 P.2d 486, 496 (Alaska 1974); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 397-398, 140 U.S. App. D.C. 313, 325-326 (1970); Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 108-09 (6th Cir. 1973); Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454 (11th Cir. 1991).
6. It is nothing new to say that an "extraneous influence" from the audience of a capital trial should not be allowed to influence the jury. See Fuselier v. State, 468 So. 2d 45 (Miss. 1985). If it is necessary, the trial court may take whatever steps required to purge the courtroom of potential taint, even to the extent of excluding all members of the audience. Of course, no such drastic remedy is requested here -- simply that the jury not be intimidated by ranks of armed, uniformed officers in the courtroom.
WHEREFORE Mr. CLIENT moves that this Court enter an order as follows:
1. Excluding all uniformed police officers from the courtroom during the trial of this case; and,
2. Requiring that any armed security officers be unobtrusively placed so that the jury cannot see their weapons.
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