LOUISIANA PUBLIC DEFENDER BOARD

 

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IN THE FIFTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PARISH OF PEINE DE MORT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
No. _____

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STATE OF LOUISIANA, Plaintiff
v.
JOHN CLIENT, Defendant

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MOTION FOR DISCLOSURE OF ANY
POSSIBLE BASIS OF JUDICIAL RECUSAL

COMES NOW, JOHN CLIENT, by counsel, and moves this Court pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 2, 3, 5, 13, 14, 16 & 17 of the Louisiana Constitution to reveal any possible basis for judicial recusal. In support of his motion, Mr. Client states as follows:
1. "Courts, like Caesar's wife, must be not only virtuous but above suspicion." U'Ren v. Bagley, 118 Or. 77, 245 P. 2d 1074, 1075 (1926); See also Pearson v. Parsons, 541 So. 2d 447, 456 (Miss. 1989) (Pittman, J., concurring) (A judge "must be, to quote from the bench opinion, 'Like Caesar's wife . . . his conduct must be beyond doubt above suspicion.'"). As the Supreme Court of West Virginia has held:
[T]he public expects a judge to be a model of integrity and a paradigm of "proper" conduct. It is imperative to our system of justice that this model be untarnished by even the appearance of impropriety. A loss of confidence in the judiciary can only lead to diminished respect for the law. "If gold will rust, what shall iron do?"

In Matter of Neeley, 364 S.E. 2d 250, 254 (W. Va. 1987) (quoting G. Chaucer, Prologue to the Canterbury Tales ("That if gold ruste, what shal iren do? For if a preest be foul, on whom we truste, no wonder is a lewed man to ruste")).
2. The question of disqualification is not whether a judge actually is biased, for a judge must be disqualified, "without finding fault . . . so that even the appearance of impropriety can be avoided." Collins v. Dixie Transport Inc., 543 So. 2d 160, 166 (Miss. 1989) (emphasis in original) (quoting Haralson v. Haralson, 483 So. 2d 378, 380 (Miss. 1986)); see State v. LeBlanc, 367 So. 2d 335, 341 (La. 1979) (courts should only be impartial, but above the suspicion of partiality). As the federal courts have held:
The question is not whether the judge is impartial in fact. It is simply whether another, not knowing whether or not the judge is actually impartial, might reasonably question his impartiality on the basis of all the circumstances.
Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114, 1116-17 (4th Cir. 1978). See also Hall v. Small Business Administration, 695 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983) (disqualification required "if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about his impartiality.").
3. Therefore even when this Court may be sure that the Court will strive to be absolutely impartial, disqualification is rightly required so that "justice [will] satisfy the appearance of justice." In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 625, 99 L. Ed. 2d 942, 946 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 75 S. Ct. 11, 99 L. Ed. 11 (1954) (emphasis supplied)). This rule has been jealously guarded by the appellate courts, fully realizing that "this `stringent rule may sometimes bar judges who have no bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties.'" Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 243, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 1611, 64 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1980) (quoting In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). 4. Nothing ill is imputed to anyone by a suggestion of disqualification. However, "[t]he protection of the integrity and dignity of the judicial process from any hint or appearance of bias is the palladium of our judicial system." United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 497 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir. 1974). Against this backdrop, Mr. CLIENT respectfully moves that this Court consider any possible basis for disqualification in this case.
5. It cannot be left up to the defendant to assure that the trial judge is impartial -- the duty rests upon the trial judge to act on any hint of impropriety sua sponte. As the Georgia Supreme Court has held, there rests with the trial judge a duty to make "a disclosure on the record [of any basis for recusal]." Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 196, 214, 345 S.E.2d 831, 847 (1986). The federal courts agree that there is "place[d] on the judge a personal duty to disclose on the record any circumstances that may give rise to a reasonable question about his impartiality." United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1537 (7th Cir. 1985); accord SCA Services Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 117 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Amerine, 411 F.2d 1130, 1134 (6th Cir. 1969).
6. Some specific grounds for automatic recusation are set out in the code of criminal procedure. Article 671(A) states:
In a criminal case a judge of any court, trial or appellate, shall be recused when he:
(1) Is biased, prejudiced, or personally interested in the cause to such an extent that he would be unable to conduct a fair and impartial trial:
(2) Is the spouse of the accused, of the party injured, of an attorney employed in the cause, or of the district attorney; or is related to the accused or the party injured, or to the spouse of the accused or party injured, within the fourth degree; or is related to an attorney employed in the cause or to the district attorney, or the spouse of either, within the second degree;
(3) Has been employed or consulted as an attorney in the cause, or has been associated with an attorney during the latter's employment in the cause;
(4) Is a witness in the cause;
(5) Has performed a judicial act in the case in another;
(6) Would be unable, for any other reason, to conduct a fair and impartial trial.
La.C.Cr.P. art. 671(A). The law is clear that if any of the reasons set out in the code exist, a court must recuse him or herself. State v. Lemelle, 353 So. 2d 1312, 1314 (La. 1977).
WHEREFORE, Mr. CLIENT respectfully suggests that this Court should consider whether any bases for recusal exist. If they do, Mr. CLIENT requests that they be made known to counsel for both parties, in open court, so that the parties may properly evaluate whether a further motion to disqualify would be appropriate.
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