IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PARISH OF PEINE DE MORT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA
v.
JOHN CLIENT
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MOTION TO REVEAL THE DEAL

COMES NOW, JOHN CLIENT, by counsel, and moves this Court pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 2, 3, 5, 13, 14, 16 & 17 of the Louisiana Constitution to order the prosecution to reveal the deal. In support of his motion, John Client states as follows:

1. So-called "deals" with witnesses are a classic form of Brady material. See, e.g, DuBose v. LeFevre, 619 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1980) (failure to admit promise that witness would be rewarded by favorable testimony); Skipper v. Wainwright, 598 F.2d 425, 427 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 974, 100 S. Ct. 469, 62 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1979); United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1978) (failure to disclose assurances of reward for favorable testimony); United States v. Sanfilippo, 564 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1977) (witness testified untruthfully concerning scope of agreement with prosecution); State v. Curtis, 384 So. 2d 396 (La. 1980); State v. Baudean, 332 So. 2d 460, 461 (La. 1976); State v. Felton, 522 So. 2d 626, 627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
2. This is true even where there is some technical way in which the prosecution can pretend that no deal exists. The misconduct is even worse where there an "apparent effort [on the part] of the prosecution to conceal the true nature of the dealings with its key witness. . . ." United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1978). This Court "will not tolerate prosecutorial participation in technically correct, yet seriously misleading, testimony which serves to conceal the existence of a deal with material witnesses." Blankenship v. Estelle, 545 F.2d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 1977). Where a witness likely expected a deal, but the prosecution refused to put it in writing and disclose to the jury exactly what it was, this
only increased the significance, for the purpose of assessing his credibility, of his expectation of favorable treatment. Since a tentative promise of leniency could be interpreted by the witness as being contingent on his testimony, there would be an even greater incentive for him to "make his testimony pleasing to the prosecutor."

Porterfield v. State, 472 So. 2d 882, 884 (Fla. DCA 1, 1985); accord Campbell v. Reed, 594 F.2d 4, 8 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Bynum, 567 F.2d 1167, 1169 (1st Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Washington v. Vincent, 525 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1976); Marrow v. State, 483 So. 2d 17, 19-20 (Fla. DCA 2, 1985).
3. As has become painfully obvious over the course of this case, it is not sufficient for the government to make some vapid revelation that a snitch has received immunity for his testimony--key to the jury's assessment of the witness' testimony is for the jury to understand what the witness has received immunity for. Therefore, in revealing the deal, the prosecution should reveal all the bad acts that the snitch has revealed, and the bad acts that others (including other snitches) have revealed against the snitch in question.
4. The state should also reveal the identity and any deal struck with any so-called "confidential informant," even if such other snitch would not be testifying for the prosecution at trial. Especially in a case such as this--built upon a gossamer thread--it is important that John Client show the jury why the government became so infatuated with the informant's case, deciding to strike some kind of deal with the Devil Himself (Fred Informant), allowing Satan to escape his just deserts for more murders than the average person has hot dinners.
5. The state's interest in not disclosing the identity of a confidential informant "must give way where the disclosure of an informant's identity or of the contents of his communication is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or to the fair determination of an issue before the court." State v. Williams, 392 So. 2d 619, 621 (La. 1980).
WHEREFORE, the defendant respectfully requests that this Court set his motion down for an evidentiary hearing, and that this Court issue an order requiring the state to reveal any deals, implicit or explicit.

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