IN THE FIFTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PARISH OF PEINE DE MORT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
No. _____

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STATE OF LOUISIANA, Plaintiff
v.
JOHN CLIENT, Defendant

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MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE

COMES NOW, JOHN CLIENT, by counsel, and moves this Court pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article 1, Sections 2, 3, 5, 13, 14, 16 & 17 of the Louisiana Constitution, and other law set out below, to order a change of venue in this case. In support of his motion, Mr. Client states as follows:

1. In State v. Bell, 315 So. 2d 307 (La. 1975), the seminal case on this issue, the Supreme Court indicated some of the factors that should be considered in assessing the need for a change of venue. In other cases, the Court has identified other issues that should be taken into account. Obviously, until a hearing has been held, Mr. Client cannot identify all the factors that should weigh in favor of a change of venue. However, Mr. Client discusses some of them below.
2. For example, the Supreme Court has held that it is of particular significance if stories are headliners in the television or other media. State v. Clark, 442 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (La. 1983). [Note the degree of publicity the case has received.]
3. The Bell Court identified one important factor as "the nature of the pretrial publicity. . . ." Id., 315 So. 2d at 311. In this regard, we must look to the prejudicial quality of the facts or rumors that have circulated. For example, nothing could be more prejudicial to a fair determination of guilt than that the public was told that Mr. Client wants to plead guilty. [Note the nature of publicity the case has received.]
4. In State v. Bell, the Supreme Court strongly condemned "the connection of government officials with the release of the publicity. . . ." Id., 315 So. 2d at 311. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly condemned such governmental interference with the right to a fair trial, and emphasized that such involvement would provide additional reason to move the case elsewhere. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 725, 83 S. Ct. 1417, 10 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1963); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 359-61, 86 S. Ct. 1507, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966). As the Court stated in Sheppard:
Had the . . . officers of the court[] and police placed the interest of justice first, the news media would have soon learned to be content with the task of reporting the case as it unfolded in the courtroom -- not pieced together from extrajudicial statements.

Id. at 362. In contravention of the courts' prohibition, various government officials have given highly prejudicial opinions about this crime to the media. For example, [Note examples of government officials discussing the case publicly.]
5. The Bell court also admonished this Court to assess "the severity and notoriety of the offense. . . ." Id., 315 So. 2d at 311. If anything is more severe than a case where the death penalty is being sought, it is a capital case where several people were killed. Here, it has been said by authorities to be "the city's first triple homicide in at least 25 years." [Note the characterization of the severity of the offense.]
6. There have been other prejudicial elements injected by these stories. [Note other prejudicial portraits in the press; for example, description of Client's demeanor.]
7. The Supreme Court has also mandated that this Court consider "other events occurring in the community which either affect or reflect the attitude of the community or individual jurors toward the defendant. . . ." State v. Bell, 315 So. 2d at 311. Indeed, the stories discussed above are not the only ones that have prejudiced Mr. Client's right to a fair trial, for he has significantly suffered for publicity that was mainly directed towards others. [Note peripheral events that are prejudicial to the client.]
8. The constitutional standard of fairness requires that a defendant have a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors." State v. David, 425 So. 2d 1241, 1246 (La. 1983). When the accused requests a change of venue, this Court must ask "whether the accused [may] receive[] a fair trial, unfettered by outside influences." State v. Willie, 410 So. 2d 1019, 1024 (La. 1982) (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S. Ct. 1507, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966)); State v. Baldwin, 388 So. 2d 664, 670 (La. 1980) (whether "there was such prejudice in the collective mind of the community that a fair trial was impossible") (citing La. Code Crim. Pro. art. 622).
9. "art. 1, Section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution . . . grant[s] [the accused] a right to trial by an impartial jury." State v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 261, 263 (La. 1986). In this case, as in Brown, "extensive press coverage, when combined with the notoriety of the case and the outrage in the community over the life verdict in [the case of another capital indictee] Prestridge, [has] had a cumulative effect that deprived defendant of a fair and impartial trial." Id. at 263.
10. If this Court is not convinced either now or after a hearing that a change of venue should be granted, the Court should summon some eligible persons from the jury pool to demonstrate the need for a change of venue. In State v. Clark, 442 So. 2d 1129 (La. 1983), the Supreme Court approved a "'dry run' voir dire . . . [in which] thirty eight potential jurors were questioned." Id. at 1133; see also State v. Sonnier, 379 So. 2d 1336, 1343 (La. 1979) (noting that there was a "'dry run' venire"); State v. Jones, 351 So. 2d 1194, at 1195 (La. 1977) (noting that there had been a critically important "dry run voir dire" as part of the motion for a change of venue).
11. It is not enough to say that we should wait until trial, and waste scarce judicial resources going through voir dire. There comes a point where this prejudice cannot be cured in voir dire, whatever the jurors may say. Even if jurors assure the trial court that they will try to be impartial, such anticipated protestations of impartiality cannot be taken at face value. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961) (rejecting argument that taint was cured by voir dire, although "[n]o doubt each juror was sincere when he said he would be fair and impartial to petitioner"); see also Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 845 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980) ("[t]he jurors' assurances that they are equal to the task are not dispositive of the rights of the accused"); United States v. Williams, 568 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[t]he effect of exposure to extra-judicial reports on a juror's deliberations may be substantial even though it is not perceived by the juror himself, and a juror's good faith cannot counter this effect"); Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir. 1968), aff'd after retrial, 430 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022 (1971); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 879 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975); Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2nd Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963) (jury could not honestly be found to be impartial in spite of the fact that jurors gave assurances of impartiality); Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 112-13 (1st Cir. 1952). A change of venue should be ordered now.
WHEREFORE Mr. Client moves that this Court order that venue be changed in his case to a venue where he will get a fair trial.
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