IN THE FIFTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PARISH OF PEINE DE MORT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
No. _____

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STATE OF LOUISIANA, Plaintiff
v.
JOHN CLIENT, Defendant

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MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE

COMES NOW, JOHN CLIENT, by counsel, and moves this Court pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article 1, Sections 2, 3, 5, 13, 14, 16 & 17 of the Louisiana Constitution, and other law set out below, to continue the case from October 18, 1993, to a later date when the defense shall have had reasonable time to prepare for trial. In support of his motion, Mr. Client states as follows:
1. Since this is to be a capital prosecution, exacting standards must be met to assure that it is fair. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has held, "[d]eath, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the jury's determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." State v. Myles, 389 So. 2d 12, 30 (La. 1979) (citing cases); see also Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584, 108 S. Ct. 1981, 100 L. Ed. 2d 575 (1988) ("[t]he fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment gives rise to a special '"need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment"' in any capital case") (quoting, Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 363-64, 97 S. Ct. 1197, 51 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1977) (quoting, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1976) (White, J., concurring))).

(a) Ex Parte Litigation of this Motion
2. As a preliminary matter, it should be pointed out that the statements set forth below are made in generalities. Mr. Client has a constitutional right to prepare a defense without having to disclose it to the prosecution. He likewise has a constitutional right to sufficient time to prepare his case. It is axiomatic that "the accused's constitutional rights . . . are 'co-equal' and that he cannot be coerced to sacrifice one in order to enjoy the other." State ex rel. Gentry v. Fitzpatrick, 327 So. 2d 46, 47 (Fla. App 1 Dist. 1976). There can be no "penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege . . . [and the courts cannot] cut[] down on [a] privilege by making its assertion costly." Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965); see also United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S. Ct. 1209, 20 L. Ed. 2d 138 (1968); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206, 80 S. Ct. 274, 4 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1960). The only way to reconcile the two rights that Mr. Client enjoys in this case is to allow partial ex parte litigation of this motion, so that he is not forced to disclose those aspects of his case that he does not choose to disclose. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1985) (showing of need for defense expert funds must be ex parte).

(b) The Right to a Continuance
3. Both the Code and the case law make clear that defense counsel in a criminal case must be given a reasonable time to prepare the defendant's defense. See La. Code Crim. Pro. art. 707 (motion for continuance to be granted when in "the interest of justice"); art. 709; and ar