IN THE FIFTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PARISH OF PEINE DE MORT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
No. _____

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STATE OF LOUISIANA, Plaintiff
v.
JOHN CLIENT, Defendant

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MOTION FOR A TRANSCRIPT OF THE GRAND
JURY PROCEEDINGS OR TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT,
OR: THE GRAND JURY WAS ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO
PROTECT THE ACCUSED, AND IT IS TIME TO TAKE IT BACK

COMES NOW, JOHN CLIENT, by counsel, and moves this Court pursuant to the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 2, 3, 5, 13, 14, 16 & 17 of the Louisiana Constitution to produce a transcript of the grand jury proceedings or, in the alternative, to dismiss the indictment against him. In support of his motion, Mr. CLIENT states as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. We know the prosecution was present during the indictment process, and therefore had access to the facts, and what occurred. We also know that the defense was intentionally and entirely excluded, for the law provides in pertinent part:
A. (1) Only the following persons may be present at the sessions of the grand jury:

(a) The district attorney and assistant district attorneys or any one or more of them;

(b) The attorney general or an assistant attorney general;

(c) The witness under examination;

(d) A person sworn to record the proceedings of and the testimony given before the grand jury. . . .

La. Code Crim. Pro. art. 433. The question becomes one of whether there is any possible constitutional justification for denying Mr. CLIENT access to the important facts that occurred during the indictment process. This must also be set in light of the prosecution's on-going obligation to provide prior inconsistent statements of witnesses to the defense.
2. The first question is why should the prosecution not disclose the Grand Jury transcript? If past history is anything to go by, in denying Mr. CLIENT this right the prosecution will doubtless intone the allegedly "indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings," and cite this Court to State v. Trosclair, 443 So. 2d 1098 (La. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1205, 104 S. Ct. 3593, 82 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1984). To the contrary, in Trosclair the Court held that "justice may demand that discrete portions of [Grand Jury] transcripts be made available. . . ." Id. at 1102 (quoting Douglas Oil Co. of California v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219-20, 99 S. Ct. 1667, 1673, 60 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1979)).
3. When faced with the prosecution's obligation to provide Brady material to the defense, the question then becomes what the prosecution's definition of Brady material is. This only goes to show a point that should be obvious from the start--that it is not entirely reasonable to expect the prosecution to always see exculpatory evidence in the prior statements of their witnesses. The fox should not be asked to guard the hen house. Especially where--as is the case here--absolutely no state interest exists not to provide the grand jury testimony to the defense, there should be a clear policy favoring its disclosure to the defense.
4. In any event, as set forth below, Mr. CLIENT has the right to have the Grand Jury proceedings recorded. Apparently it was recorded in some manner. If it were not, there is a presumption of prejudice and the indictment must be dismissed.

A. THE DEPRIVATION OF MR. CLIENT'S RIGHTS THROUGH ANY "LOSS" OF THE GRAND JURY TRANSCRIPTS WOULD RENDER THIS TRIAL AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY IN ADVANCE

5. Any failure to preserve a record of what was done in the Grand Jury must result in the dismissal of the indictment against him.
B. THE STATE IS UNDER A DUTY NOT TO DESTROY OR INTENTIONALLY FAIL TO PRESERVE THE RECORD OF THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS

6. The United States Supreme Court recently issued a ruling which has changed the way in which Grand Juries are permitted to operate. In Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 110 S. Ct. 1376, 108 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1990), the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution forbids blanket rules which preclude the disclosure of matters occurring before the Grand Jury.
7. An analysis of the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Butterworth is dispositive of the issue before this Court. Reviewing the history of the Grand Jury, the Court noted that the most important reason for the tradition of secrecy surrounding the institution in its nascent years was "to safeguard citizens against an overreaching Crown and unfounded accusations." Butterworth v. Smith, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 580.
8. These interests are still served by the preservation of secrecy in certain limited circumstances. For example, until such time as the Grand Jury makes a decision, secrecy encourages witnesses to come forward and precludes suspects from being sufficiently forewarned to flee the jurisdiction. Id. at 580. However, "[w]hen an investigation ends, there is no longer a need to keep information from the targeted individual to prevent his escape. . . ." Id. at 582.
9. Similarly, preserving inviolate the evidence given against "persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury [assures that they] will not be held up to public ridicule." Id. at 580. However, the Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that "'prior cases have firmly established . . . that injury to official reputation is an insufficient reason for repressing speech that would otherwise be free. . . .'" Id. at 583 (quoting Landmark Communications Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841-42, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 56 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978)).
10. More often than not, nowadays, the secrecy of the Grand Jury may now be used as a tool by the State to inflict an unfair disadvantage upon the accused. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted "that grand juries are expected to 'operate within the limits of the First Amendment,' as well as other provisions of the Constitution." Butterworth v. Smith, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 33 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1972)); see also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1962).
11. In cases "where a person 'lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance,' we have held that 'state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information. . . .'" Butterworth v. Smith, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 581 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103, 99 S. Ct. 2667, 61 L. Ed. 2d 399 (1979)); see also The Florida Bar v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 109 S. Ct. 2603, 105 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989). 12. In federal courts "[a]ll proceedings, except when the grand jury is deliberating or voting, shall be recorded stenographically or by electronic recording device." Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 6(e)(1). The cloak of secrecy has been wrenched from the Grand Jury for some important reasons:
(1) Ensuring that the defendant may impeach a prosecution witness on the basis of his prior inconsistent statements before the grand jury.

(2) Ensuring that the testimony received by the grand jury is trustworthy.

(3) Restraining prosecutorial abuses before the grand jury. . . .

Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 6(e)(1) (Advisory Committee Notes) (citing 8 Moore, Federal Practice, para. 6.02(2)(d) (2d ed. 1972); 1 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure--Criminal, Section 103 (1969)).
13. Various states now provide for the recordation of grand jury proceedings. See, e.g., Ariz. R. Cr. App. 12.8 (1987) (all proceedings except deliberations); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, para. 112-17 (1979) (all testimony); Nev. Rev. Stat. Section 172.215 (1992) (all proceedings save for consultations with counsel and deliberations); N.J. Stat. Ann. Section 2A:73B-1 (West. 1992); N.M. Stat. Ann. Section 31-6-8 (Michie 1983) (all proceedings except deliberations); N.Y. Crim. Pro. Law Section 190.25 (McKinney 1986); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. Section 23A-5-11.1 (testimony of witnesses in potential felony case); Vermont R. Crim. Pro. 6(d) ("All testimony before the grand jury shall be taken down by a court reporter or recording equipment"); see also O.C.G.A. Section 15-12-83 (1990); Ore. Rev. Stat. Section 132.090. Recordation has frequently been encouraged by the courts. See, e.g., State v. Hejl, 315 N.W.2d 592 (Minn. 1982) (ruling that a mandatory policy of recordation was appropriate in a judicial district, since there was not countervailing policy interest); Vihko v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 413 (Va. App. 1990); State v. Piskorski, 419 A.2d 866 (Conn. 1979).
14. Applying this law to the manner in which the Grand Jury proceedings were conducted in this case, it is clear that the procedures in this case contravened various constitutional provisions, including the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the accused and the First Amendment rights of all the citizens of Louisiana, to the extent that no record was made in the Grand Jury room, or that it is not made available to the defense.
15. Certainly, there is no reason why a record should not be made of the Grand Jury proceedings in this state. Indeed, the relevant statute provides in pertinent part:
A. (1) Only the following persons may be present at the sessions of the grand jury:

* * *

(d) A person sworn to record the proceedings of and the testimony given before the grand jury. . . .

La. Code Crim. Pro. art. 433.
16. Any limited interest in pre-indictment secrecy is served by a limited prohibition against disclosures. In this case, Mr. CLIENT has been indicted, and that interest is clearly dissipated altogether. However, the ban ad infinitum against ever disclosing the inconsistent testimony and perjury committed by state witnesses cannot be reconciled with the constitutional rights of the accused.
17. The only effective way of assuring that witnesses in the Grand Jury are brought to account is to preserve a verbatim transcript of their testimony. This transcript also has the benefit of assuring that other fundamental rights of the accused are respected. If there is a transcript, then it must be disclosed. The Supreme Court has indicated that, in addition to the two statutory reasons requiring that the evidence be divulged, there may be other "compelling reason[s] why the testimony should be disclosed." State v. Ward, 483 So. 2d 578, 585 (La. 1986) (citing La. Code Crim. Pro. art. 434(A)). Also, the comments to the Louisiana Code sets forth example of reasons why disclosure of grand jury proceedings should be allowed:
The statutory obligation of secrecy does not preclude revelation of testimony to show that a person's constitutional rights have been violated. In State v. Smalling, [125 So. 2d 399, 405 (La. 1960)] the court said: "The indictment . . . is the foundation of the criminal case, and if it is grounded, in whole or in part, on evidence secured in violation of a constitutional right, it is an absolute nullity." Although the court in that case did not deal with the rule of secrecy . . . it necessarily follows that a revelation of testimony may be required in order to determine if a person's constitutional rights have been violated. . . .

Comment (e), La. Code Crim. Pro. art. 434.
18. Since Mr. CLIENT has a constitutional right to exculpatory evidence, this means that there is a "compelling reason" to divulge the Grand Jury testimony. This is hardly a novel question for this Court, for a grand jury transcript has frequently been ordered disclosed. See, e.g., State v. Peters, 406 So. 2d 189, 190 (La. 1981); State v. Evans, 512 So. 2d 615, 619-20 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); see also State v. Ates, 418 So. 2d 1326, 1329 (La. 1982). Indeed, the Mississippi Supreme Court recently ruled that a transcript of the Grand Jury proceedings, or some equivalent, must be provided to the defense under the state's obligation of discovery of prior statements of witnesses. See Addkison v. State, 608 So. 2d 304 (Miss. 1992).
19. On the other hand, if the record has not been kept, it is the failure to preserve such a transcript which is the subject of further discussion below.
C. THE STATE MAY HAVE VIOLATED ITS DUTY TO PROVIDE MR. CLIENT WITH A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

20. The State bears the burden of establishing a clear and complete record of criminal proceedings. Wright v. Lacy, 664 F. Supp. 1270, 1275 (D. Minn. 1987) (citing Golden v. Newsome, 755 F.2d 1478, 1479 (11th Cir. 1985)). Ultimately, the State has the "duty . . . to have the trial testimony entered in the records of the court and to file a transcript following a guilty verdict." Zant v. Cook, 259 Ga. 299, 379 S.E.2d 780, 781 (1989) Graham v. State, 757 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Ark. 1988); Gardner v. State, 754 S.W.2d 518, 524 (Ark. 1988). Obviously, this can only be done if the whole case is recorded.
21. In light of the judge's role as arbiter of the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial, the duty to ensure the complete recordation of the case also rests with the court. See United States v. Garner, 581 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1978). "The trial judge has a duty to see that the reporter makes a true, complete and accurate record of all proceedings." American Bar Association, Standards Relating to the Trial Judge Section 2.5 (1972) (emphasis supplied). The Mississippi Supreme Court, for example, has directed the trial courts to "require, as a minimum, a recording of all facets of a criminal trial . . ." Dorrough v. State, 437 So. 2d 35, 37 (Miss. 1983) (emphasis supplied).
22. A record of prior proceedings must be provided pre-trial. As the Fifth Circuit recently explained in Tague v. Puckett, 874 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1989):
A state must provide an indigent with a transcript of prior proceedings when needed for an effective defense.

Id. at 1014 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S. Ct. 431, 433, 30 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1971)); See also Fisher v. State, 532 So. 2d 992, 999 (Miss. 1988); Carter v. State, 156 Ga. App. 633, 275 S.E. 2d 717, 718 (1980); Harris v. State, 552 So. 2d 857 (Ala. Cr. App. 1987); People v. Wells, 776 P.2d 386 (Colo. 1989); State v. Johnson, 261 La. 620, 260 So. 2d 645, 649 (1972); Matter of Bullabough, 365 S.E.2d 642, 646 (N.C. App. 1988); State v. Moss, 44 Ohio App. 3d 27 (1988); Billie v. State, 605 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tex. Cr. App. 1980).
23. This rule has been consistently applied to transcripts of pretrial hearings. See, e.g., State v. Archie, 462 So. 2d 248, 248 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); Graham v. State, 757 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Ark. 1988); Gardner v. State, 754 S.W.2d 518, 524 (Ark. 1988); State v. Kay, 701 P.2d 281, 288 (Idaho App. 1985); Wilson v. State, 701 P.2d 1040 (Okl. Crim. App. 1985); People v. Johnson, 450 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 1982); Commonwealth v. Dean, 501 A.2d 269, 270 (Pa. Super. 1985); Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 552, 558 (Del. 1985); Bell v. State, 757 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Ark. 1988). If the state does not record, preserve and reveal Grand Jury transcripts, these precepts will be violated.
D. IF HE IS DENIED THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS, MR. CLIENT WILL BE DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

24. Courts faced with the issue have recognized that the unavailability of pretrial transcripts is a serious impediment to the preparation of a defense. See, e.g., People v. Ladmirault, 263 Cal. Rptr. 285, 286 (Cal. App. 2d 1989). Particularly where (as here where the grand jury proceedings were held ex parte) some of the hearings were held without the presence of counsel or different counsel has taken on the case, this Court "cannot say with assurance that the error [of absence of counsel] in this case was not prejudicial . . ." Graves v. State, 505 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Ark. 1974) (reversed and remanded for new trial); see also State v. Perry, 401 N.W.2d 748, 754 (Wis. 1987) (fact of new counsel is an important factor in decision whether to grant new trial for deficient transcript).
25. When judging the effectiveness of counsel from a pretrial perspective, the question is not the same as the retroactive review found in federal habeas corpus litigation. Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court has clearly distinguished between claims of deficient counsel raised before, rather than after, trial. State v. Marshall, 414 So. 2d 684, 687 (La. 1982); State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993).
26. Therefore, when considering the effective assistance of counsel from the pre-trial perspective, virtually any state interference with counsel's ability to provide effective representation will violate the Sixth Amendment and Section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution. See Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988) (discussing the differing standard for the prospective assessment of competent representation).
27. The failure to provide counsel with important transcripts is clearly enough state "interference" to assure a violation of these provisions. The imbalance in this case makes the issue particularly clear: The prosecution was present when the witnesses testified in the Grand Jury, and therefore knows what they said. The defense was not even notified that Grand Jury proceedings would be held, or that Mr. CLIENT was their target. "[T]he Due Process Clause . . . forbids enforcement of . . . rules unless reciprocal rights are given to criminal defendants." Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472, 93 S. Ct. 2208, 37 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1973).
E. MR. CLIENT WILL BE DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW IF HE IS NOT PROVIDED WITH A TRANSCRIPT OF THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS

28. In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that a basic function of a constitutional death penalty statute is to "make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death." Id., 428 U.S. at 303. The Court stressed the qualitative difference between a sentence of death and any other penalty, and the need for effective appellate review. Id.; see also, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976). A basic component of the decision upholding the Georgia statute in Gregg was the thorough appellate review which was made a part of the legislation. Because this is a capital case, in the event Mr. CLIENT is found guilty and sentenced to death, the Louisiana Supreme Court must review the sentence and the entire record. This review is to be performed on the entire record so as "to ensure that 'this unique penalty [is not] wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed," Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2763, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2958, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1976).
29. In Dunn v. State, 733 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987), the court reviewed a capital murder case in which the trial court ordered the transcription of the court reporter's notes on pretrial hearings. Id. at 213. In spite of due diligence the appellant had been unable to secure the transcript. Id. at 215. In holding that appellant was entitled to a new trial notwithstanding whether he showed or even alleged harm, that court stated:
We may not shirk our duty to review the 'entire record' . . . on grounds that an appellant has not shown 'harm' in being denied portions of a transcription of notes taken by the court reporter during the course of the trial of a capital case. That this Court have before it the entire record in a capital case serves a public policy which considers assuring evenhanded imposition of the ultimate penalty as important, if not more so, than faulting the one condemned for inability to demonstrate on appeal how an error resulted in disadvantage.

Id. at 216 (citations omitted).
30. In view of the gravity of the penalty of death and the need to assure that it not be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 209, courts asked to perform mandatory sentence review or appellate review in capital cases have declined to do so without the entire record. See, e.g., Kelly v. State, 692 P.2d 563, 566 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (reversing and remanding for new trial rather than review sentence on incomplete record); State v. Sanders, 321 S.E.2d 836, 837 (N.C. 1984) (vacating sentence and remanding for new trial as inadequate transcription precludes meaningful appellate review); Van White v. State, 752 P.2d 814, 819-21 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (reversing and remanding for new trial because mandatory sentence review precluded on incomplete record); see also Wilson v. State, 273 S.E.2d 9, 12 n.8 (Ga. 1980) ("in view of this court's responsibility in the appellate review of cases in which the death penalty was imposed, an accurate and complete transcript is essential").
31. The Fifth Circuit has observed that even in a non-capital case the right to appeal would be rendered "illusory" if the appellate court is not able to study the entire record. United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d 1303, 1305 (5th Cir. 1977). Similarly, in Zant v. Cook, 259 Ga. 299, 379 S.E.2d 780 (1989), the Georgia Supreme Court "found that [appellant] was denied his right to appeal his . . . conviction by the state's failure to preserve the transcript of his trial . . . ." Id. 379 S.E. 2d at 781; see also Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 108 S. Ct. 1981, 100 L. Ed. 2d 575 (1988) (state court had vacated prior conviction in the absence of a complete record for review).
32. The State's failure to preserve the record of the Grand Jury proceedings makes it all the more difficult for Mr. CLIENT to pursue certain avenues of relief from the proceedings against him. For example, his challenges to the unconstitutional manner in which he was indicted in the first place will be made more onerous, if not impossible.
33. This is why the rule requiring transcription of all proceedings mandates that "the state must afford the indigent a record of sufficient completeness to permit consideration of his points . . ." Miller v. State, 299 S.E.2d 174, 176 (Ga. App. 1983); See also Dorrough v. State, 437 So. 2d 35, 37 (Miss. 1983) ("where errors are assigned in a portion of the record not accurately preserved for appeal, this Court and the defendant are disadvantaged on review"); State v. Willis, 552 So. 2d 39, 43 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989) (omission from record, needed for a proper determination of the appeal, requires reversal); State v. Green, 322 A.2d 495, 499 (N.J. 1974) ("The complete transcript is of crucial importance for a meaningful review of both the appellate court and to new counsel on appeal."); Morris v. State, 772 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (appellant shall not be penalized by state's failure to furnish proper record).
F. THE ONLY APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR ANY "LOST" TRANSCRIPTS IN THIS CASE WOULD BE DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT AGAINST MR. CLIENT

34. There remains only the question of what to do about all this. There is a presumption of prejudice which arises when the indigent accused is denied his right to a free transcript. Cf. United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d 1303, 1306 (5th Cir. 1977). In Britt, the Supreme Court held that "'a defendant who claims the right to a free transcript does not bear the burden of proving inadequate such alternatives as may be suggested by the State or conjured up by a court in hindsight.'" State v. England, 363 S.E.2d 725, 728 (W. Va. 1987) (quoting Britt v. North Carolina 404 U.S. at 230).
35. Even without this presumption, it is clear in this case that Mr. CLIENT's substantial rights to a defense and meaningful appellate review are adversely affected by the State's failure in its duty to provide a transcript of the pretrial proceedings. Mosley v. State, 461 So. 2d 34, 37 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984). The same must be true of indictment proceedings.
36. If this case goes to trial after the denial of a transcript of important proceedings, Mr. CLIENT's conviction will be reversed. See State v. Robinson, 387 So. 2d 1143, 1144 (La. 1980); State v. LeBlanc, 367 So. 2d 335, 337 (La. 1979); State v. Jones, 351 So. 2d 1194, 1196 (La. 1977); State v. Ford, 338 So. 2d 107, 109 (La. 1976); United States v. Brumley, 560 F.2d 1268, 1280-81 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218, 1223 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Garcia-Bonifascio, 443 F.2d 914, 915 (5th Cir. 1971); Austell v. State, 638 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex. Cr. App. 1982); State v. Perry, 401 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Wis. 1987); People v. Audison, 338 N.W.2d 235, 237-38 (Mich. App. 1983); State v. Shafer, 284 S.E.2d 916, 919 (W.Va. 1981); People v. Barnard, 188 Cal. Rptr. 176, 181 (App. 1982); Hall v. State, 515 So. 2d 134, 135 (Ala. Cr. App. 1987); Martin v. State, 744 S.W.2d 658, 659 (Tex. App. 1988).
37. Logic therefore compels the conclusion that there is little point in going forward to trial. Rather, the indictment must be dismissed. Harris v. State, 552 So. 2d 866, 874 (Ala. Cr. App. 1989).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Mr. CLIENT respectfully moves that this case be set down for an evidentiary hearing, and that the indictment against him be dismissed if no transcript is produced of the Grand Jury proceedings.
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